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LEGISLATURES AND DEFENSE:  THE COMPARATIVE 
EXPERIENCE 
 
Jeanne Kinney Giraldo 
 
Democratically elected representatives in a country’s legislature have an 
important role to play in formulating defense and military policy and monitoring its 
implementation (i.e., oversight).  Legislative participation in these areas is desirable for a 
number of reasons.   Democracy as “rule by the people” is enhanced by input from all 
elected officials, not just those who comprise the executive branch.  The needs of society 
and the military are more likely to be balanced to the extent that representatives from all 
segments of society are consulted in the policy process.  Although consulting multiple 
actors in the Congress on defense issues may be time-consuming, the end result is usually 
better and longer lasting policy.  The policy produced tends to be better as both the 
executive and military actors involved are forced to defend their positions publicly.  
 
Legislative oversight can determine whether laws are being effectively 
implemented and whether they do in fact work in the way they were intended.  Policy 
failures can be identified and laws changed accordingly.  Consulting the legislature on 
important issues helps develop a national consensus and decreases the chances that 
defense policy will suffer serious modifications with a change in government. Such 
policy stability is particularly important since key aspects of defense, such as 
procurement decisions or the building of an international reputation, can only be 
effectively carried out over the long term.  Legislative debates on defense issues 
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contribute to the formation of an informed public that will be able to participate 
constructively in the policy process in the future. The transparency of this process of 
open debate and decision legitimizes both the armed forces and defense policy.  
 
In addition to their contribution to good policy making, legislatures can provide a 
check on executive misuse of the military.  Legislative participation in the officer 
promotion process and the need for legislative approval of the deployment of the military 
can prevent the politicization of the armed forces and its misuse by the executive for 
personal, partisan, or unconstitutional ends.  Furthermore, the public nature of legislative 
oversight of defense policy -- the investigation of mistakes and wrongdoing -- can act as 
a deterrent on executive and military shirking of their duties.   
 
Despite the importance of legislative participation in the formulation and 
implementation of defense and military policy, the role parliaments play varies greatly 
among democratic regimes. This paper examines the role the legislature plays in asserting 
civilian control over the military in a wide range of countries at various stages of 
democratic development.  In particular, it focuses on the factors that affect the 
willingness and ability of the legislature to participate in the defense arena.1  The first and 
second sections discuss the role of the legislature in formulating and overseeing defense 
policy, respectively, and the factors that shape this role. The third section discusses other 
powers legislatures might exercise in order to influence the military, such as control over 
                                                            
1 Countries representing a broad, geographical cross-section are examined: Argentina, Brazil, Germany, 
Great Britain, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, and the United States.  The 
countries chosen provide variation with respect to levels of democratic development, regime type 
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the officer promotion process and the use of the military in internal operations. The final 
section evaluates the extent to which the legislature is able to develop the expertise 
necessary to participate effectively in the defense arena. 2 
 
1.  The Role of Legislatures in Shaping Defense and Military Legislation 
The role that the legislature will play in shaping legislation in any policy area will 
depend in large part upon the constitutional, legal, and political factors that shape 
executive-legislative relations in a given country.  In particular, the presidential or 
parliamentary nature of the regime, the rules of legislative procedure, and the size and 
discipline of the parties backing the executive are important in shaping the role of the 
legislature.3  In general, legislators are thought to have less influence in parliamentary 
systems where the government controls the legislative agenda and is backed by a 
disciplined majority party (this is usually the case in Great Britain and, hence, is referred 
to as the Westminster model). The US Congress occupies the opposite end of the 
spectrum of legislative influence; substantial powers over the legislative agenda and the 
content of legislation are often wielded by a Congress dominated by a party that opposes 
the president (or by a supporting party whose backing for presidential initiatives is often 
undermined by lack of party discipline).   Other presidential and parliamentary systems 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(presidential or parliamentary), and the degree to which the legislature participates in the formulation and 
monitoring of defense policy. 
2 This paper is meant to be a companion piece to James Lindsay’s excellent discussion of the role of the 
legislature in monitoring the military in the US case.  See James M. Lindsay, "Legislative Control of the 
Military: Lessons from the American Experience," Center for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper # 
12, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2000. 
3 For a more extensive discussion of the factors affecting legislative capacity in general, see “Strengthening 
Legislative Capacity in Legislative-Executive Relations,” National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs, Legislative Research Series, Paper #6, 2000.  For a discussion of the influence of legislative 
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lie somewhere in between, with many presidential systems falling closer to the 
parliamentary model than the US model.  In many legislatures, executive influence is said 
to approach the “90 percent rule:” the executive proposing 90 percent of the bills and 90 
percent of those getting passed.4  While this figure understates the legislative influence 
that occurs behind the scenes during the drafting and amending of legislation, it does 
capture the contrast between the situation in many presidential and most parliamentary 
systems of the world and the United States.  
 
While constitutional, legal, and political factors account for variation in the role 
the legislature plays from country to country, one commonality is the way they have 
organized internally to handle their main task of shaping legislation.5   In almost all 
countries legislators have created specialized committees in each policy area, with a 
jurisdiction typically matching that of the executive ministry they shadow (e.g., defense, 
economy, education).6  The creation of committees is usually left to the discretion of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
procedures, see Herbert Döring, “Parliamentary Agenda Control and Legislative Outcomes in Western 
Europe,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, XXVI, 1 (February 2001). 
4 In other cases, this might be closer to the 60/80 rule: the government introducing 60 percent of the total 
bills considered by the legislature and 80 percent of those being approved.  Regardless of the exact figures, 
the general point of executive dominance remains the same.  David M. Olson, Democratic Legislative 
Institutions: A Comparative View. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994), p. 84.   
5 See Lawrence D. Longley and Roger H. Davidson, eds., The New Roles of Parliamentary Committees  
(London:  Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1998).  For more on the role of committees, see “Committees in 
Legislatures: A Division of Labor,” National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Legislative 
Research Series, Paper #2, 1996. 
6 France is the most notable exception, with only six committees operating in its legislature.  This division 
of committees was motivated by a deliberate effort to weaken committees (and hence the legislature, which 
was deemed to have been too strong during the French Fourth Republic).  In other cases, committees are 
sometimes formed that cover the jurisdiction of two or more ministries – for example, a committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defense.  The disadvantage of such an arrangement is that the committee will be 
unable to oversee the activities of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as closely as 
would two separate committees.  However, since decisions made in Foreign Affairs often have an impact 
on Defense (and vice versa), this arrangement might help facilitate the coordination of policy (and any 
necessary tradeoffs) between the two spheres.  Countries with separate committees are usually able to solve 
the coordination problem quite easily by creating joint committees whenever legislation deals with issues 
under the purview of more than one committee.   
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legislature, which implements them either through legislation or congressional protocol 
(Standing Orders). In very rare cases, committees enjoy a constitutional status.  (In 
Germany, for example, the Defense Committee is the only legislative committee 
mandated by the Constitution.)7  Most democratic legislatures have created defense 
committees; less frequently, legislatures have created intelligence committees to oversee 
government policy and operations in this important area.8  Committees can examine 
matters more closely than the entire chamber and the smaller size of the committee 
usually facilitates compromises between representatives of different parties.   In many 
legislatures, the workload handled by the committees is such that they have been called 
the “engine room” of the legislature.9    
 
Committees have the most influence over the legislative process (relative to the 
floor) when they can control which bills are considered by the legislature (e.g., the United 
States) or can pass legislation on their own, without the need for a floor vote (e.g., 
Brazil). In contrast, committees have the least influence when bills are not required to 
even pass through their doors and can be directly treated on the floor of the legislature.   
Most committees fall between the two extremes.  They respond to a legislative agenda set 
                                                            
7 Article 45a, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law.  In Italy, all legislative committees are designated by the 
Constitution, an apparent reaction to attacks on Parliament during the Fascist regime.   
8 In addition, Foreign Relations and Internal Security committees sometimes make policy that affects the 
role the Armed Forces will play, and Budget committees everywhere have some authority over the military 
by virtue of their input into the defense budget.  Although this paper focuses on defense and intelligence 
committees, the special challenges identified also apply to the other committees when dealing with defense-
related issues. 
9 Richard Calland, ed., The First Five Years: A Review of South Africa’s Democratic Parliament (Cape 
Town: Idasa, 1999).  Similarly, in the German Bundestag committees "carry the chief burden of 
parliamentary work, exercise their power to amend legislation and function as a ‘responsible critic of the 
government.’” (“Committees in Legislatures,” p. 6.) 
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by the government and/or party groups in the legislatures,10 amend legislation drafted by 
the executive, and submit a report to the floor on the legislation and proposed changes.  
These reports provide guidance to legislators on the floor on how to vote by discussing 
the merits of the policy and revealing the positions taken by different committee 
members.11  
 
In addition to the functions listed above, defense committees perform a special 
function not required of committees operating in other policy areas:  they serve to balance 
the right of the public in a democracy to be informed and the need for secrecy that 
governs some activities and policies in the realm of national security affairs.  Defense 
committee members, if they have the appropriate security clearances, are delegated the 
responsibility of making decisions on behalf of the public as a whole and their fellow 
legislators.   In the process, defense committees often hold private hearings, in contrast to 
the usual (and more preferable) committee practice of public hearings designed to 
contribute to transparency and a public debate on the issue at hand.   
 
Despite these congressional provisions for secrecy, it is not uncommon for the 
executive to appeal to the national interest and international security obligations to bypass 
                                                            
10 Committees must be given sufficient time to review the legislation before them, something that is not 
always the case, particularly with budget proposals submitted only weeks before the budget must be 
approved.  In the German Bundestag, committees are “obligated to speedily conclude the tasks assigned to 
them,” a proviso that usually gives them ample time to consider legislation but does not permit them to take 
charge of the legislative agenda by stalling projects indefinitely.  [See Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson, 
and R. Gerald Livingston, eds.  The US Congress and the German Bundestag (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1990), Chart 4 in appendix, note 3.]  In many other countries, executives have the option of assigning 
different levels of “urgency” to a bill, which require the committee to consider the bill during a short time 
period.   
11 While committee reports to the floor are decisive for the committee to influence legislation and are a 
standard practice in most legislatures, some new legislatures did not initially incorporate this practice (e.g., 
South Africa).   
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the legislature’s role in making and overseeing policy.  In 1978, for example, the German 
government purchased sophisticated AWACS planes without the consent of the Defense 
Committee and then failed to give the committee a full accounting.  The government 
justified their behavior by claiming that serious international consequences would have 
resulted from any other decision.12  Similarly, the Socialist government in the early 1980s 
in Spain made important decisions, like the purchase of 72 F-18 fighter jets, without 
consulting parliament and only informing the legislature after the fact.13  In Brazil, the 
military and the national security council drafted a secret project for military participation 
in the development of the Amazon (Calha Norte) shortly after the transition to 
democracy and a year and a half passed before Congress even learned of its existence.14   
 
Despite these obstacles, the legislature has played an important role in shaping 
defense legislation in many transitional democracies.15  In Argentina, for example, 
Congress played an important part in the elaboration of the Ley de Defensa Nacional 
which redefined the military's role after the transition to democracy.16  In South Africa, 
the Defence Committee played an important role in the restructuring of the military and, 
given the importance of the military issue to the transition, was regarded as one of the 
more influential committees in the legislature in the first years of the new democracy.  In 
                                                            
12 Helmut Schafer and Christian von Stechow, “Control of Security Policy,” in Thaysen, et al. 
13 Antonio Marquina, “Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy Since Democratization,” in Kenneth Maxwell, 
ed., Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 1991), p. 44. 
14 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), p. 123.  
15 For a discussion of changes that need to be made to defense and military legislation in order to 
consolidate democracy, see Jeanne K. Giraldo, “Democratizing Civil-Military Relations: What do countries 
legislate?”  Center for Civil-Military Relations, Occasional Paper #7, Monterey, California, June 2001.  For 
a more general discussion of how legislation can be used to assert civilian control over the military, see 
Lindsay. 
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the Philippines, the Defense Committee has been a key actor shaping the decisions taken 
to modernize the armed forces.17 
 
The centrality and sensitivity of military issues in many transitions to democracy 
often requires that policy in this area be the product of consensus among all key parties.  
As a result, in a number of countries, the chairmanship of the defense committee is 
allotted to a member of an opposing party in the first democratic legislature.  In Spain, a 
Socialist headed the committee even thought the government was led by a party of the 
center-right, while in South Africa a former head of the South African National Defence 
Force (and member of an opposition party) headed the Defence Committee in a system 
otherwise dominated by the governing African National Congress party.  Not only have 
defense committees played a key role in getting legislation passed, but they devote a bulk 
of their time to this task.  One survey suggested that defense committees spent 
approximately 30-40 percent of their time on legislation (with an additional 20 percent 
devoted to oversight, 20 percent to the budget, and 20 percent to other activities).18   
 
2.  Legislative Oversight of Defense and Military Policy 
Legislative oversight has two functions – to hold the government and the military 
accountable for their actions and to see if laws are working the way they were intended.  
Exercising oversight is often an extremely time intensive and laborious task that yields 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
16 See José Manuel Ugarte, La Comisión de Defensa Nacional: Un rol casi inédito, pp. 244-251 in Gustavo 
Druetta, Eduardo Estévez, Ernesto López, and José Enrique Miguens, eds., Defensa y democracia: Un 
debate entre civiles y militares (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Puntosur Editores, 1990). 
17 Renato Cruz De Castro, “Adjusting to the post-U.S. bases era: The ordeal of the Philippine military’s 
modernization program,” Armed Forces and Society, 26:1 (Fall 1999). 
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fewer political and policy benefits than the actual making of legislation.    Oversight can 
be exercised in a number of ways.  Many legislatures have provisions for the floor to 
question ministers, either in person (the so-called Question Time in Westminster 
parliaments) or through petitions for information sent by individual representatives (or 
small groups) to the ministry.   Most often this kind of questioning is used to score 
political points, by embarrassing the minister or demonstrating to constituents that their 
representative is acting on their behalf.  It is less effective as an oversight mechanism 
since the questions can easily be dodged (in the case of Question Time) or ignored (in the 
case of written petitions, even when laws require a response).  
 
For oversight to be exercised effectively, there must be institutions devoted to 
such a task.  Usually, the defense committees themselves are charged with oversight.  In 
some cases, special subcommittees devote themselves solely to the task of oversight in a 
given policy area (as is the case in the United States). In others, a separate committee is 
created to handle oversight of one dimension of policy (e.g., finance) across issue areas 
(e.g., Public Accounts Committees in Westminster systems), with the obvious loss of 
expertise in a given policy area that is often essential to oversight. 
 
In some countries, legislative committees have been created to oversee 
intelligence agencies, but these are not as widespread as defense committees, which exist 
in almost every legislature.  In South Africa, members of the majority government (who 
had been targets of government intelligence when in the opposition) took advantage of 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
18 Bruce George and Alison Graham, “Defence Committees in Democratic and Democratising 
Legislatures,” paper presented to the Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, Berlin, 
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the transitional moment, when attention was focused on these issues and the intelligence 
agencies were weaker, to create legislative committees overseeing the intelligence 
agencies. In the United States, in contrast, legislators were content to delegate the 
management of intelligence agencies to the executive until a series of abuses were 
revealed in the early 1970s; the House and Senate Committees on Intelligence celebrated 
their first full year of existence in 1978.   Many other countries lack congressional 
oversight of intelligence agencies altogether (e.g., Brazil, Great Britain, Russia, Spain).  
In Russia, intelligence agencies are subject to a vague and unenforced requirement to 
give reports to the legislative branch.  In Brazil, a 1999 law called for the creation of a 
joint Parliamentary Committee to monitor intelligence agencies, however, this is left to 
the discretion of the Congress, where there seems to be little interest among legislators in 
serving on such a committee.19  As of June 2001, the committee has not even been 
created.   
 
In addition to forming specialized committees, legislators often find it necessary 
to rely on the help of others in monitoring executive and military behavior.  This help 
takes two main shapes:  “police patrol” and “fire alarm.”   “Police patrol” approaches, as 
the name suggests, involve creating mechanisms that actively search out mistakes and 
malfeasance: audits carried out by independent agencies and reporting requirements 
written into legislation are two of the most common forms.  “Fire alarm” monitoring, in 
contrast, occurs when outside parties interested in a policy area, such as the news media 
or special interest groups, raise the alarm about misguided policy or actions.  Both forms 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
August 1994, pp. 20, 23. 
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of oversight function by punishing misdeeds that are discovered and/ or implementing 
legislation to correct policy mistakes; they also work by deterring behavior that might be 
exposed by routine checks or concerned parties.  
 
In the area of defense, police patrol approaches have been employed by a number 
of countries.  In the United States, legislation frequently requires an agency to inform a 
committee before or after it makes a policy decision or requires the General Accounting 
Office of the Congress to carry out audits and other evaluations.    Of the 5704 GAO staff 
employed in 1979, 1200 were tasked with defense auditing (21 percent of the staff) and 
230 of 983 reports submitted in FY 1979 were on defense issues (23 percent of the 
total).20  Like the committee staffers and Congressional Research Service personnel, the 
GAO plays a proactive role in monitoring the implementation of legislation.  Since 1974, 
it has been authorized to inform Congress on its own initiative.21  In Great Britain, in 
contrast, the Comptroller and Auditor General is an office holder of the Crown and as 
such does not conduct inquiries at the request of the committees of the House of 
Commons.  Unlike the GAO, it makes no recommendations or criticisms in its reports.22  
Between 1965 and 1978, it conducted only 47 inquiries on defense issues (an average of 
3.4 per year).23  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
19 Marco Cepik, “The New Brazilian Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment,” paper presented at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 2000, p. 12. 
20 If classified reports sent directly to the DOD were included, the percentage would be even higher,  See 
Andrew Cox and Stephen Kirby, Congress, Parliament and Defence: The Impact of Legislative Reform on 
Defence Accountability in Britain and America (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 20. 
21 For more on the evolution of the GAO role, see “The Background and History of GAO.” Available at 
http://www/gao/gov/about/history.html. 
22 Cox and Kirby, pp. 12-13. 
23 Cox and Kirby, p. 13.  These reports were debated by a total of 98 MPs (Cox and Kirby, p. 15).   
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In South Africa, the president appoints Inspectors General to oversee the National 
Intelligence Agency, which conducts domestic intelligence, and the South African Secret 
Service, which is responsible for foreign intelligence work.  The Inspectors General 
report to the Joint Committee on Defense in the legislature, which monitors expenditures 
and orders investigations of abuses.  
 
Fire-alarm monitoring is also common, with human rights groups, mothers’ and 
youth groups, and independent think tanks monitoring government policy on such issues 
as human rights, conscription, and national security, respectively.  Despite this, the use of 
fire-alarm monitoring in defense-related areas (especially intelligence) tends to be less 
effective than in other policy areas.   The number of independent groups in civil society 
with the ability and interest in monitoring intelligence tend to be fewer than those in other 
policy areas.24  In some countries, strict national security laws prohibit the free 
expression of criticisms in defense-related areas on the grounds of national security (e.g., 
South Korea, Great Britain).   
 
3.  Other powers 
In addition to formulating policy and overseeing its implementation, legislatures 
are often able to influence military and defense policy in a number of additional ways.  
One of the most important and regular avenues is through control over the defense 
budget.  Policy preferences should be reflected in the budget, and the amount of money 
assigned to different functions will affect the roles and missions undertaken by the armed 
                                                            
24 Loch Johnson, “The U.S. Congress and the CIA: Monitoring the Dark Side of Government,” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly, V: 4 (November 1980), pp. 477-99. 
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forces.  Legislative control over the budget also provides an incentive for the military to 
be attentive to the preferences of the legislature and their demands for information as they 
carry out their policy and oversight duties.25 
 
In addition, the legislature often has the duty of overseeing the executive in the 
exercise of his or her prerogatives as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.  For 
example, as commander-in-chief, the executive usually has the power to promote officers 
to the high command and to command the use of troops.  Both issues are often central to 
the debate over the role of the armed forces that occurs in countries transiting away from 
a military regime or civilian police state towards a democracy and it is important for 
constitutions or related legislation to specify the relative roles of the executive and the 
legislature in these spheres.   
 
In many countries, congressional participation in the officer promotion process 
helps to prevent the executive from using personal or partisan criteria to guide personnel 
decisions.   In Indonesia, an important reform in the democratization process were laws 
passed in 2000 giving the DPR (People’s Representative Assembly) the right to approve 
or disapprove the President’s decision to appoint and dismiss the commander of the 
armed forces and the national police chief.26  In Spain, the Parliament holds extensive 
discussions on nominees for promotion and then makes recommendations to the 
                                                            
25 For a more in-depth discussion, see Jeanne K. Giraldo, "Defense Budgets and Civilian Oversight," 
Occasional Paper # 9, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Monterey, California, June 2001. 
26 Indonesia’s Road to Constitutional Reform: The 2000 MPR Annual Session.  An Assessment Report. 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.  October 2000, p. 6. 
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executive.27 In contrast, the 1988 Brazilian constitution and the 1993 Russian constitution 
reserve for the President the exclusive responsibility for promoting all general-officers.  
In addition, the screening and selection of officers permits legislatures to send a strong 
message about the kind of behavior that is expected of the military – a message that the 
executive may be unwilling or unable to send.  In Argentina, for example, the Senate 
occasionally refused to confirm President Raúl Alfonsín's nominees to the high command 
in order to express their repudiation of any officers involved in human rights violations.28  
 
Most constitutions also require legislative participation in decisions to invoke a 
state of siege or state of emergency and deploy troops domestically.   One survey of 
legislation in 77 countries revealed that in 12 cases the parliament alone had the right to 
declare an emergency, and in another 51 cases parliament was required to approve any 
governmental declaration of a state of emergency.29  In the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United States, for example, the congress alone has authority to declare a state of 
emergency in case of internal disturbance.  In Spain, the Government can declare a state 
of emergency in response to internal disturbances only with parliamentary approval; this 
lasts for 30 days and can be renewed with parliamentary approval for another 30.30  Some 
newly democratizing countries have reversed existing laws which permitted the executive 
the right to declare a state of emergency without congressional approval:  for example, 
the new Filipino constitution requires legislative and judiciary approval of a declaration 
                                                            
27 Jorge Zaverucha, “The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and 
Brazilian Transitions,” Journal of Latin American Studies, 25 (1993), p. 294. 
28 Zaverucha, p. 294. 
29 International Parliamentary Union, Parliaments of the World, second edition, volume 1, 1986, p. 1273. 
30 International Parliamentary Union, p. 1274. 
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of martial law, but only after 60 days.31 In contrast, the Brazilian and Russian 
constitutions give Presidents the ability to call on the military to restore law and order 
without Congressional approval. 32  
 
Civilian Expertise  
As discussed above, one of the main challenges the legislature faces in exercising 
its jurisdiction over policy formulation and oversight is overcoming the dominance of the 
executive, which has access to a much greater supply of expertise and information than 
the legislature. While the executive’s near monopolistic control over information applies 
to most policy areas, in the defense arena the deck is even more stacked against 
legislative influence.  Secrecy laws exacerbate the natural information asymmetry 
between the legislature, on the one hand, and the executive and the military, on the other.  
The executive and the military can appeal to “national security” to withhold information 
and thus to effectively deny the legislature jurisdiction over certain issues.  The 
information asymmetry is often exacerbated by legislators themselves who are said to 
have little interest in developing expertise in military matters and would rather focus on 
areas that are more electorally profitable.  These challenges plague legislative oversight 
of defense, even in countries with a long democratic history, like Great Britain.  Even in 
the United States, the combined expertise of the president’s political advisers, the 
                                                            
31 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Political Developments in the Philippines,” p. 182 in Thomas W. Robinson, ed., 
Democracy and Development in East Asia: Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America), 1990. 
32 Article 137 of the Brazilian constitution requires the President to attain congressional authorization for a 
state of siege when law and order are threatened.  However, if Congress refuses, the President can invoke 
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administrative staff of the Department of Defense, and the professional soldiers in the 
military gives the executive an edge over the legislature in their control of the expertise 
necessary to manage the country’s defense.  The challenges are still greater in countries 
transiting away from authoritarian regimes with a history of secrecy, military 
prerogatives, and executive dominance of the policy process.  
 
Faced with this reality, legislatures must find ways to cultivate the expertise 
necessary to challenge the executive and to participate effectively and credibly in 
constructing the laws that will regulate the military’s role and in monitoring the 
implementation of these laws.  Regardless of the formal rules governing the passage of 
legislation, a legislature is more likely to be consulted in pre-legislative stages and its 
recommendations heeded at later stages if it has expertise.  In addition, expertise is a 
necessary ingredient for responsible policy making.  The following sections highlight the 
special challenges defense committees face in cultivating expertise among their members, 
developing a professional staff, and eliciting information from the executive, the military, 
and other experts.  
 
Committee Members 
Typically, committee seats are divided among parties in proportion to their share 
of the seats in the legislature and then assigned to legislators by their party leaders, in 
large part based on their individual requests.  Since legislators usually self select into 
committees in this fashion, they often have some personal or electoral interest in defense.  
Active duty or retired officers holding seats in the legislature are the most likely to self 
 21 
select into defense committees.  This is the case in Russia where military officers serve 
on (and head) the Defense Committee of the State Duma and often are the only members 
with security clearances. 33  Other committee members may be civilians who have been 
involved in defense issues and civil-military relations, either as academics or as members 
of the government (it is not uncommon, for example, for a former minister of defense to 
serve on the Defense Committee in the German Bundestag).   
 
Committee members without a military background or prior experience in defense 
issues will need to develop their expertise on the job.  How much time they are able to 
devote to this and whether they will use the knowledge gained to stake out a role 
independent of the executive depends on a number of factors.   
 
To the extent that developing expertise and exercising oversight requires access to 
classified information, civilian legislators are often at a disadvantage relative to their 
military counterparts who already have clearances.  In a number of countries, distrusting 
legislators are wary of the possible costs an overly secretive or vengeful executive branch 
might impose on the holders of security clearances.  In Russia, for example, civilian 
defense experts in the Defense Committee do not hold clearances because they want to 
retain the right to travel abroad without restriction.34  In Brazil, legislators opposed a 
provision of a bill on intelligence oversight proposed by the government of Fernando 
                                                            
33 David Betz, “No Place for a Civilian: Russian Defence Management from Yeltsin to Putin,” paper 
presented to the International Studies Association, 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, March 14-18, 
2000.  The Indonesian military have 38 “reserved” seats in the legislature, the holders of which act as a 
voting bloc (unlike the military representatives in the Russian Duma).  The balance of power in the current 
legislature in Indonesia gives the military a swing vote on most defense issues.  This enables the military to 
exert a great deal of influence on defense policies and on efforts to exert civilian control over the military.   
34 Betz. 
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Collor de Mello because it imposed stiff penalties on those who disclosed information 
(five to ten years for intentional disclosures and three to five years for unintentional 
leaks).35  In Great Britain, members of the House Committee on Defence are not security 
vetted but they can access material classified as NATO Top Secret.36 
 
At a very practical level, committee members need to have time to develop their 
expertise.  Legislators can only realistically be expected to participate effectively in one 
or two committees; those assigned to multiple committees are unlikely to develop 
expertise in all of them.  A certain stability in committee membership is also necessary, 
so that individual committee members are in their post long enough to learn the material 
and establish key relationships with the ministry staff and other more independent experts 
in the defense area.  This stability is undermined if there is a high turnover at election 
time, as is often the case in many developing countries where the identification of the 
electorate with parties is unstable or where the legislature is only a stepping stone to 
personal wealth or other political offices, and is not a desirable career in and of itself. 37  
In some countries, the practice of rotating committee chairs and memberships among 
party representatives so that all spend some time in the more “desirable” committees – 
usually those that provide access to state resources – militates against the development of 
expertise.  
 
                                                            
35 Hunter, p. 64.  The law that was eventually passed in 1999 does not specify how much access legislators 
would have to secret information nor the penalties imposed in the case of an information leak (Cepik, p. 
12). 
36 George and Graham, p. 16. 
37 In other cases, a shortage of qualified personnel may be the motive behind high turnover rates.  In South 
Africa, for example, 122 of 400 National Assembly members and 13 of 27 committee chairs left their posts 
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In general, legislators will only have an incentive to invest their time and political 
capital in developing their own expertise (or creating institutions which house legislative 
expertise) if it serves their career goals, whether these be reelection, policy influence, a 
future position in the ministry of defense, or some combination of the above.  For 
example, if legislators have to work hard to defend their seat from challengers and 
defense is not an electorally salient issue, they are unlikely to devote much time to 
developing their expertise in that area.  In contrast, legislators who feel relatively secure 
about their chance of reelection, have an interest in policy, and believe that the legislature 
as a whole (and, in particular, the committees of which they are a part) can influence the 
shape of legislation, will have an incentive to develop their expertise.  Members of the 
opposition can use this expertise to shape legislation and to oversee the executive.  
Members of the governing party tend to have less of an interest in oversight (and the 
public scandals often associated with this activity).  Frequently, however, they will have 
an interest in policy formulation.  Loyal party experts can contribute to good governance 
(and hence government popularity) in at least two ways:  by monitoring legislative 
proposals put forth by their own ministers, correcting any miscues, and/or by brokering 
compromises between parties in the committee.  Often, the committee is a place for 
aspirants to government positions to develop and showcase their expertise in a given 
subject matter.  In the case of a coalition government, committee experts are likely to pay 
special attention to the legislative proposals made by ministers from allied parties to 
ensure that they respect the coalition contract.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
even before the first term ended in 1999.  The majority were ANC members who were appointed to other 
posts in the government (Calland, p. 10). 
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Despite these benefits of committee input, party or government leaders often 
discourage independent behavior by committee members and chairs.  They are able to do 
this in a number of ways.  In some parliamentary systems (e.g., Germany, Great Britain), 
government members sit on committees and are able to influence the proceedings.   In 
Russia, the Ministry of Defense has chosen a less orthodox approach to influencing the 
defense committee.  It endorses slates of officers in legislative elections, many of them 
active duty, who then act as allies of the Ministry in the Duma.  The Ministry ran 123 
officers in the 1996 legislative elections;38 subsequently they were able to block the 
passage of a law changing conscription.39  More commonly, party leaders can exert 
influence through their control over the naming of committee members and government 
leaders through their power to appoint legislators to government positions.  In Great 
Britain, for example, the Whips Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Cabinet Office and 
chairmen of the committee “collude” to prevent independent behavior by committees. 40 
“Subversive” chairs are co-opted by being promoted to roles as parliamentary leaders 
(e.g., whips) or ministers, where they are required to toe the party line.41  
 
Legislative Staff 
In addition to developing their personal expertise, committee members rely on a 
professional committee staff, congressional research services, and outside experts in 
independent or party think tanks for the expertise necessary to exercise their legislative 
                                                            
38 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian 
Armed Forces (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 144. 
39 Alexei G. Arbatov, “Military Reform in Russia: Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects,” Working Paper, 
International Security Program, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 
September 1997. 
40 Cox and Kirby, p. 298. 
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and oversight tasks.  In the US House of Representatives, for example, each of the 19 
standing committees is authorized to hire 18 professional staff assistants and 12 clerical 
aides (plus one additional staffer allotted each subcommittee).42  The House Armed 
Services Committee employs around 81 staffers and the Senate Armed Services 
Committee 51; many have a military or civilian background working in the Department 
of Defense. 43  In 1985, committee staff in the House of Representatives numbered 2146, 
personal staff 7528, and research staff 2595 (counting the General Accounting Office, the 
Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office).44  Committee 
staffers often play a proactive role, negotiating and working to build coalitions, while the 
Congressional Research Service is charged with providing Congress with a list of 
subjects and policy areas that committees might analyze in depth.  A host of think tanks 
covering the ideological spectrum monitor government policy on a wide range of 
defense-related issues.   
 
This stands in stark contrast to the level and nature of staffing available to the 
legislature in other countries.  To the extent that committee and research staff  are trained 
professionals, they tend to be librarians or lawyers rather than individuals with expertise 
in defense matters.  In Great Britain, for example, the Research and Parliamentary 
Division employed around 100 people in 1980, most of them librarians.  In contrast, 
during the same year, the Congressional Research Service in the US employed 614 
research and information specialists supported by over 250 clerical and administrative 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
41 Bruce George M.P. and J. David Morgan, “Parliamentary Scrutiny of Defense,” The Journal of 
Legislative Studies,  5: 1 (Spring 1999), p. 10. 
42 “Committees in Legislatures,” p. 15.   
43 George and Graham, p. 11. 
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staff. 45  After a recent improvement in staff resources the Defence Committee in Great 
Britain can now rely upon four retired military personnel and two academic advisers.  In 
South Africa, the committee staff for the entire National Assembly was increased in late 
1995 from 25 to 60.  Most of the staff are professionals trained in law.46  In Argentina, 
committee staffs usually number about half a dozen – one staffer assigned to the 
committee and the others provided by the party leadership.47  South Korean committees 
are advised by half a dozen policy specialists.48  The legislature as a whole has a decent-
sized reference staff but this tends to be underutilized and bureaucratic.49  A survey of 29 
defense committees in Europe revealed staff resources varying from one person (in 
Ireland, Iceland, and Norway) to ten (in Ukraine).  In a number of cases, defense 
committees in newly democratizing Central and East European legislatures were better 
staffed than those in Western Europe.50 
 
The German Bundestag perhaps comes closest to the United States in employing a 
serious-minded professional staff to assist in the legislative process, yet even there the 
numbers pale in comparison to the United States.  In 1987, research services staff 
numbered 234 in comparison with 2595 individuals so employed in the United States.  
The 519 delegates to the Bundestag employed 2200 personal staff members,51 
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approximately 10 percent of whom were academics or legislative experts.52 In 1982, 
every standing committee in the German Bundestag had one executive-rank civil service 
secretary, one senior assistant and one or two clerical staff.53  In the Bundestag, unlike the 
US Congress, most of the funding is channeled through party groups (Fraktionen) rather 
than committees and most of the policy experts are employed by these groups.  In 1987, 
the Fraktionen employees numbered 619. 54   
 
A number of factors account for the discrepancy between the United States and 
other legislatures in levels of staffing.  In some cases, particularly in developing 
countries, the level of resources available to the government are simply much lower than 
in the United States.  This, however, cannot explain the differences between staffing in 
the US Congress and parliaments in Great Britain or Germany (nor the similarities 
between Western Europe and Eastern Europe).  In most countries other than the United 
States, the executive has control over resources and few incentives to invest in the 
development of independent sources of information and expertise for the legislature.  
This is particularly the case in presidential systems or in parliamentary systems where a 
majority party controls the executive.  In Germany, for example, the majority Christian 
Democrats controlled the executive for much of the post-war period and realized that any 
resources allocated to the legislature could be used by the opposition Social Democrats to 
challenge the government.  When the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats formed 
the Grand Coalition in 1969, efforts to increase parliamentary resources were no longer 
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cast in terms of strengthening the opposition party at the expense of the government.  
Instead, they were seen as a means of strengthening the parliamentary majority relative to 
the “establishment” (i.e., the few members of parliament who were members of 
government or party leaders and as a result had access to resources).  The internal 
challenge to the establishment was given weight by leftist criticism of an unresponsive 
legislature coming from outside of parliament in the late 1960s.55  Individual legislators 
were given more resources, and parties (in an effort to avoid excessive decentralization of 
the legislative process) fortified the system of federally-financed party working groups 
within the legislature. 
 
Even where the legislature has access to resources, it does not always have the 
incentive to spend the money on professional staff, instead preferring personal staff, the 
majority of whom perform administrative or constituency services rather than policy 
development.  Although personal staffers comprise the majority of the staff in the US 
Congress (outnumbering committee staff by a ratio of approximately 3.5 to 1), the 
proportion for developing countries is often much more skewed (as of 1993, the ratio of 
personal staff to committee staff in the Argentina House was approximately 26 to 1).56  In 
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Great Britain, the House of Commons Defence Committee spent approximately 69% of 
its allotted budget in 1996-97 on travel and under 4 percent on specialists.57    
 
Ability to Solicit Information 
In addition, a number of legal provisions and institutional mechanisms affect the 
ability of committees to access the expertise necessary to make good policy and exercise 
effective oversight of the military and executive.  In all policy areas, executive ministries 
are jealous of their legislative prerogatives, and bureaucratic agencies are averse to 
outside monitoring; as a result, both groups tend not to be forthcoming with information 
solicited by Congress.  Consequently, it is important that committees have formal powers 
both to request such information and to enforce the requests. These powers include the 
right to request government documents, summon witnesses (including ministers), and 
hold public hearings.  In the United States, congressional invitations to testify are taken 
seriously because Congress has the power to subpoena witnesses and to cut the budgets 
of non-complying agencies.  In most other countries (e.g., Germany, Great Britain, 
Russia, South Africa), committees do not have the legal power to require the attendance 
of ministers, civil servants, or other witnesses. The only power the committees have is the 
power to embarrass the executive politically for non-compliance.   
  
Executive and bureaucratic reluctance to reveal information is exacerbated in the 
defense arena, where policy makers and especially the military have been historically 
accustomed to operating behind a veil of secrecy and unaccountability.  Although the 
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need for secrecy is certainly justified on a number of issues, the temptation is for the 
executive and the military to hide behind appeals to national security and secrecy laws to 
avoid sharing information with the legislature.   In Germany, where the Defense 
Committee has traditionally played an important role, it took three years of negotiating 
for the Defense Committee to come to an agreement with the Minister of Defense on the 
release of information related to arms procurement in 1977 and, even then, the agreement 
was an informal and unwritten one.58 In Russia, secrecy is common in defense 
legislation; decrees are signed but not published.  A new secrecy law was passed in 1993, 
but its details were not made public at the time.59   
 
Even when national security concerns are not invoked, defense committees still 
face challenges in gathering expert testimony on legislation.  One reason is the relative 
lack of experts in defense issues in civil society in many countries, and especially in new 
democracies where defense topics have traditionally been the sole preserve of the 
military.  Another reason is the difficulty of soliciting independent, expert testimony on 
executive proposals from members of the military who are subordinate to the executive 
as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.  This contrasts with other issue areas, where 
both career civil servants from the relevant ministry as well as the affected parties (e.g., 
farmers, teachers, labor unions) often give testimony critical of the executive project.  In 
the case of defense, the affected party is usually the military and, in many cases, the 
military often staffs many of the positions of expertise within the ministry of defense. 
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Democracies must decide whether or not the military should be allowed to 
provide dissenting opinions to the legislature.  In the United States, for the most part prior 
to 1940 the military limited itself to echoing the President’s position in testimony before 
Congress.60  After World War II, however, Congress insisted that military leaders be free 
to present their views directly to the congressional committees and this was codified in 
the National Security Act of 1949.61  In many other countries, however, the practice is for 
the armed forces to represent the government’s view before Congress.  In Great Britain, 
independent testimony by either members of the ministry of defense or the armed 
services carries with it an implicit requirement of resignation.  In Germany, dissenting 
views are provided informally but not in official testimony.62  In Spain complaints about 
the military budget or other issues are lodged with the executive rather than the 
Congress.63   
 
Conclusion 
The creation of defense and intelligence committees with jurisdiction over policy, 
oversight, and budget issues is necessary for the legislature to exercise its essential role in 
shaping national security policy and civilian control over the military.  In many countries, 
however, the constitutional and legal framework marginalizes the role of the legislature 
relative to the executive in formulating and implementing policy.  Some legislatures 
manage to overcome these obstacles and turn their limited legal powers into real 
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authority.  In large part, this can be attributed to their willingness and ability to generate 
expertise in defense issues.  While defense committees will benefit from any measures 
taken to strengthen the legislature as a whole, specific efforts targeted at defense are 
required to overcome the special challenges posed by this area.  An organized and 
informed civil society that is able to put defense and military issues on the political 
agenda will both enable and encourage responsible legislative execution of its 
responsibilities and encourage the legislature to press for more powers from the 
executive.  The legislature will be empowered to the extent that public pressure on the 
executive and military weakens their ability to appeal to secrecy in the name of national 
defense (and thus remain unaccountable to the legislature and the public).  To the extent 
that defense becomes a politically salient issue for political parties and their 
representatives, legislators will be more likely to carve out the time from their struggle 
for political survival to play a policy and oversight role on issues of defense and civilian 
control over the military.   
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